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Demographics and Factor Flows –
A Political Economy Approach
Abstract
We investigate the eﬀ   ect of population aging on international factor ﬂ   ows in a 
political-economy framework. Political barriers to immigration in developed countries 
and insecure property rights in developing countries impede factor ﬂ  ows. Taking 
into account diﬀ   erent generations’ conﬂ   icting attitudes towards immigration and 
expropriation, we explore how these policy barriers interact. We ﬁ  nd that incentives 
to expropriate increase as more emigration from the developing country takes place. 
Meanwhile, the industrialized country admits less immigrants as less capital is allocated 
to the developing country. Furthermore, the eﬀ  ects of population aging on international 
factor ﬂ  ows are considerably underestimated if one does not take into consideration the 
interactions between immigration and expropriation policies.
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: D78, F21, F22, J10
Keywords: Demographic change; political economy; migration; foreign direct investment
December 2011
1  Lena Calahorrano, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln; Philipp an de Meulen, RWI. – We 
thank Marta Aloi, Gabriel Felbermayr and Christoph Lülfesmann for valuable comments. We are 
especially indebted to Philipp Harms and Oliver Lorz for their support. This research project was 
sponsored by the German Research Foundation (DFG). – All correspondence to Philipp an de 
Meulen, RWI, Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Germany. E-mail: philipp.andeMeulen@rwi-
essen.de. 1 Introduction
The populations of virtually all industrialized countries and many developing countries age.
However, demographic structures diﬀer widely between industrialized and developing coun-
tries. In general, rich industrialized countries’ populations are older since birth rates are
lower and life expectancies are higher than in the developing world. Since individuals ac-
cumulate capital throughout their working life, industrialized countries dispose of relatively
large stocks of productive capital per worker. This adds to high wages but low capital
returns in comparison to developing countries. Consequently, large eﬃciency gains from
international factor ﬂows seem possible.
The signiﬁcance of demographic structures for factor ﬂows has aroused international in-
terest, see, for instance, the United Nations’ report on replacement migration (UNPD 2001)
or INGENUE (2001) and Brooks (2003) for international capital ﬂows. However, political
constraints to factor ﬂows exist both in developing and developed countries. Developing
countries with a favorable demographic structure to inward investment often do not oﬀer
the institutional framework for international investors to fully reap eﬃciency gains. Govern-
ments of industrialized countries in turn tend to be sensitive to native resentments toward
the admission of immigrants. Observed international factor ﬂows are indeed far too low
to equalize the returns to capital and labor. Brooks (2003) notes that capital ﬂows would
be considerably lower than predicted by his model if institutional risk was taken into ac-
count. Concerning labor, Facchini and Mayda (2008) make restrictive immigration policies
responsible for the low level of international ﬂows.
Hence, while international demographic diﬀerences induce economic incentives for factor
ﬂows, capital and labor mobility is politically restricted. These political restrictions are
themselves aﬀected by demographic structures: Harms and an de Meulen (2010) and Harms
and an de Meulen (2011) show that expropriation decisions are aﬀected by the age structure
in the home economy, if governments take the diﬀerent political attitudes within popula-
tion into account. A large share of young individuals in developing countries may help to
secure foreign investment. Since young agents earn mainly labor income, they beneﬁt from
high wages payed by highly productive multinationals. Moreover, due to their longer time
horizon, they are particularly aﬀected by potential investment embargoes in the wake of
expropriation. Meanwhile, Calahorrano and Lorz (2011) show in a dynamic model with two
overlapping generations that aging has an expansionary eﬀect on demand for immigrants.
This is because young immigrants are substitutes to (young) workers and complements to
(older) capital owners. Pay-as-you-go pension systems may enhance demand for immigrants
in the wake of population aging if contributions rather than beneﬁts are ﬂexible, see Haupt
and Peters (1998) and Calahorrano (2010).
Based on this research, we jointly analyze migration and investment barriers in a com-
4prehensive model. We consider a one-period setting with sequential decisions in two open
economies, each populated by two generations. While the majority is young in the devel-
oping country, the reverse is true for the industrialized country. In both economies, the
government sets policy as to maximize its political support among the two generations. The
government’s policy decision in the industrialized country is how many immigrants to admit,
while in the developing country, imported capital can either be expropriated or not.
As in models without policy restrictions, migration and FDI turn out to be substitutes.
However, the drivers behind this result are fundamentally diﬀerent. The volume of FDI
inﬂuences immigration policy, and analogously, the volume of migration inﬂuences the de-
cision to expropriate. As more emigration from the developing country takes place, the
share and thus political weight of the group opposing expropriation decreases. Meanwhile,
as more capital is allocated to the developing country, the industrialized country admits less
immigrants for two reasons. Firstly, the loss in gross returns on FDI induced by emigration
increases the larger the volume of FDI. Secondly, the potential impact of immigration on
the young generation’s welfare given by the wage bill decreases since domestic wages also
decrease.
We also investigate the eﬀect of population aging in the two countries on factor ﬂows. As
the share of old individuals in the industrialized country increases, so does the industrialized
country’s demand for immigrants, whereas the volume of non-expropriation compatible FDI
is unaﬀected. Demand for immigrants also increases as the share of old individuals in the
developing country increases. However, an increase in the share of old individuals in the
developing country decreases the volume of non-expropriation compatible FDI. Furthermore,
we show that the eﬀects of population aging become stronger when the interplay of policies
is taken into account.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We set up the economic model in
Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the developing country’s expropriation decision for exogenous
migration. Similarly, Section 5 analyzes the industrialized country’s immigration policy for
given FDI. Section 6 simultaneously considers migration and investment policies. Sections 4,
5 and 6 all explore the impact of population aging on policies. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis draws on two strands of literature. The ﬁrst one deals with the impediments to
capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries. Contrary to Lucas (1990), Alfaro et al. (2008) ﬁnd
that bad institutional quality does play a major role in explaining the low level of capital
investment in poor countries. The basic problem is that a sovereign authority cannot be
enforced to not violate property rights of private ﬁrms. To prevent investor-hostile actions,
capital investment must be incentive compatible in a way that the sovereign must be willing
5not to expropriate. Several authors deal explicitly with expropriation risk of FDI. Eaton and
Gersovitz (1984), for example, argue that the mere existence of expropriation risk distorts
FDI ﬂows even if expropriation does not occur. Cole and English (1991) and Thomas
and Worrall (1994) as well as Aguiar and Amador (2011) and Aguiar et al. (2009) model
the political economy of expropriation as a game between international investors and a
host-country government. Expropriation generates immediate beneﬁts but future costs, as
investors are assumed to punish the host country for expropriation by withholding future
investment. In such an environment, the government decides to expropriate unless the
present value of the costs exceed the beneﬁts. The authors ﬁnd that in order to avoid
expropriation, FDI must not exceed a critical threshold.
The second strand of literature we build on deals with endogenous immigration policy.
In the static models by Benhabib (1996) and Mazza and van Winden (1996), individuals
support admitting immigrants if these are diﬀerent from themselves. Preferences may be
reversed if immigrants receive political rights. This is also an important prediction of the
dynamic models of Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004) and Ortega (2005). In our model, old
capital owners’ immigration preferences are limited, even though immigrants do not have
any political rights. This is because migration entails a non-economic disutility and because
it raises the capital intensity and thus lowers returns on the part of capital invested in
the developing country, although it raises capital returns in the industrialized country. As
we do, Sand and Razin (2009) analyze the impact of aging on immigration and also on
redistribution policy. In their model the median voter’s identity may change not only due
to native population aging but also due to the immigration of individuals who have more
children than natives. This may restrain the old’s preference for admitting immigrants. We
focus on the eﬀect of marginal changes in the population share of both generations. In
contrast to Sand and Razin, we therefore assume that the median voter in the industrialized
country is always old.
3 The Basic Model
We consider an industrialized country and a developing country, both populated by young
and old individuals. Each young individual supplies one unit of labor, potentially in either
country, while the old individuals are out of the labor force.1 Each old individual in the
industrialized country owns a given amount of capital ¯ k. The old in the developing country
do not own any productive capital, only and endowment e∗ which they can consume, as
in Cole and English (1991). This is a plausible assumption since ﬁnancial institutions are
1This is a common simpliﬁcation in models on demographic change. A more sophisticated set-up with
many generations could capture the gradual change in the relative importance of labor and capital income
as individuals grow older. However, assuming only two generations is suﬃcient to illustrate the central
conﬂict between younger and older individuals.
6rudimentary in many developing countries, and savings often take the form of tangible
assets.2 The size of the total population is normalized to one in both countries:
N
y + N
o =1 a n d N
y∗ + N
o∗ =1,
where the asterisk denotes the developing country’s variables. We assume that the old are
in the majority in the industrialized country, while the opposite holds for the developing
country, that is No > 0.5a n dNo∗ < 0.5.










The size of the capital stock owned by the old generation in the industrialized country is
¯ k·No. Production in the developing country hinges on capital inﬂows from the industrialized
country (K∗ = ¯ k · No − K) since the developing country’s inhabitants own no productive
capital. We assume that foreign direct investment is administered by a mutual fund, which
coordinates the single investment decisions.
In the industrialized country total factor productivity (TFP) A is assumed to exceed
TFP in the developing country. This results from a less favorable business climate, for
instance due to an inferior infrastructure, in the developing country. However, capital ﬂows
from the industrialized country are accompanied by technological expertise. Therefore, TFP





∗ with 0 <θ<1 .
The foreign investors’ productivity thus not only hinges on the initial conditions they ﬁnd in
the developing country – such as the state of the infrastructure and know-how, the regulatory
burden etc. – but also on their know-how and their capacity to cope with these conditions.
Deﬁning M as labor migration from the developing to the industrialized country, factor
prices are given by
























in the industrialized and the developing country respectively. Both countries’ governments
set policy to maximize political support within the population, given by the weighted sum
2When introducing the expropriation policy in the developing country later in this section we argue why
the assumption that the developing country’s old do not own any capital combined with labor in production
does not drive our results.
7of inhabitants’ utilities. Each agent’s weight equals her (post-migration) population share.
As argued by Hillman and Weiss (1999), such a framework is more appropriate for modeling
representative democracies than a median voter framework.3 It can be motivated by a
probabilistic voting model as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) or Coughlin et al. (1990) and
is quite common by now as the textbook treatments by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and
Mueller (2003) show.



















The developing country’s government does not take into account emigrants’ utility, once
those have exited the country. Analogously, immigrants to the industrialized country enter
the industrialized country’s objective function.
The policy decision in the developing country concerns the expropriation of foreign capi-
tal. Expropriation refers to the seizure of the capital stock, and, for simplicity, it is assumed
to be always total. If the developing country’s inhabitants incurred no costs from expropria-
tion, the developing country would be subject to a classical time-inconsistency problem and
would always expropriate. However, expropriation usually comes at some cost, explaining
why international capital ﬂows take place despite the risk of expropriation. While we rule
out embargo threats as a measure to impede expropriation, we adopt a diﬀerent approach,
chosen e.g. by Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), Azzimonti and Sarte (2007) and Harms and
an de Meulen (2011): since foreign investors lose control over invested capital after expro-
priation, they will no longer provide their technological expertise.4 As a consequence of the
withdrawal of foreign knowledge, TFP drops to A∗ in the developing country. While the
seized capital stock may nevertheless be used for production, the productivity breakdown
reduces output.
The beneﬁt from expropriation (the gross return to capital) is distributed equally among
the developing country’s old and those young who have not emigrated: each inhabitant of





(1 − δ + θr∗)K∗
1 − M
.
Importantly, the costs of expropriation that the developing country incurs do not aﬀect its
3While political regimes in many developing are rather non-democratic, it is nevertheless appropriate
to apply the concept of support-maximizing governments. Even if political rights are not allocated fairly,
regimes cannot fully ignore the political preferences within society to not run the risk of revolution, see
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001).
4In a setting with a longer time horizon, one could also argue that expropriation reduces future capital
inﬂows, see Cole and English (1991) and Thomas and Worrall (1994). However, the time-inconsistency
problem is also present in the one-period setting that we consider: when it comes to the expropriation
decision, capital investment is sunk.
8inhabitants equally. In our setting, the TFP loss lowers the young generations wages, while
the old generation is not aﬀected negatively. Expropriation thus induces a distributional
conﬂict among demographic lines. Note that relaxing our assumption that the developing
country’s old do not own capital to be combined with labor in production does not aﬀect
this intergenerative conﬂict: Assume a situation, where the old generation in the developing
country owns domestic ﬁrms which compete with ﬁrms run by foreign investors. Labor is
assumed to allocate to both sectors until wage levels even out. Then, as a consequence of
expropriation and the subsequent technology drop in foreign ﬁrms, the wage level in the
foreign sector decreases and labor will reallocate to domestic ﬁrms. As a result, the old
capital owners from the developing country beneﬁt from higher domestic capital returns. In
such an environment, the distributional conﬂict is even reinforced.
The industrialized country’s government decides on the number of admitted immigrants.
Immigration to the industrialized country aﬀects its citizens’ welfare via its eﬀect on factor
prices. The young generation suﬀers from additional competition on the labor market which
lowers wages. The old generation beneﬁts from increasing capital returns on the part of
capital invested at home (k) and suﬀers from decreasing returns on that part invested in the
foreign developing country (k∗). Be aware that k and k∗ do not denote the capital intensities
in production (K/L and K∗/L∗) but rather the capital used in home and foreign production
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w in case of emigration
w∗ in case of non-expropriation






e∗ in case of non-expropriation
e∗ + t in case of expropriation .
As a benchmark against which we can compare a situation with an interplay of policies,
we set up two distinct models. In the ﬁrst model, FDI is endogenously determined by the
expropriation decision in the developing country while migration is exogenous. Conversely, in
9the second model migration is determined by policy in the industrialized country while FDI
is exogenous. We also analyze the impact of demographic changes in these two benchmark
models. Finally, we set up a model where both policies are endogenous. In this model
population aging has even stronger eﬀects. None of these models can be solved analytically
and we therefore recur to numerical simulations. In choosing values for our benchmark
parameters we adhere to common assumptions in the literature. The chosen values are
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Benchmark parameter values
Parameter Parameter value Source
α 0.35 B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2003)
A 1 Normalization
A∗ 0.5 Hall and Jones (1999)
Dreher et al. (2007)
˜ A 0.8S e e t e x t
Ny 0.44 UNPD (2006)
Ny∗ 0.57 UNPD (2006)
¯ k 0.16 See text
δ 0.7 Various sources
According to B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2003), the production share of capital is usually set
between 0.3a n d0 .4, so our benchmark is α =0 .35. As for productivities, we normalize TFP
in the industrialized country A to 1, since what matters for our analysis is the relative size
of A, ˜ A and A∗. (Hall and Jones 1999) ﬁnd that average TFP among developing countries
is only about 30 percent of the TFP level in the US. However, according to Dreher et al.
(2007), developing countries’ average TFP relative to the US is 0.53 if oﬃcial output is
considered and 0.84 if the shadow economy is also taken into account. Based on this, we set
the developing country’s TFP to an intermediate level, A∗ =0 .5. For choosing a value for
˜ A, we take into consideration that multinational companies’ productivity is aﬀected by both
the often less favorable local production conditions as well as by ﬁrm-related technological
knowledge. We set the industrialized country’s investors’ TFP in the developing country to
˜ A =0 .8, which yields θ =0 .625. In order to determine the relative sizes of the young and
old generations, we look at the United Nations’ Population Division’s statistics on children
per woman.5 For the period of 2000-2005, total fertility in the world’s more developed
regions was about 1.6, while it was 2.6 for the world’s less developed regions excluding the
least developed regions. With the total population normalized to one in both countries, the
resulting sizes of the young generations are Ny =0 .44 and Ny∗ =0 .57. The level of the
capital stock per investor is set equal to ¯ k =0 .16, implying an autarky capital intensity
of about 0.2 in the industrialized country. Finally, we set the rate of depreciation to 0.7.
5UNPD (2006)
10Assuming that the one period we consider lasts for about 20−25 years, this implies an annual
rate of approximately 0.05. This is within the range of the results of calibration exercises
of diﬀerent models found in the literature. Among those, Otrok (2001) ﬁnds an annual δ of
about 0.15 calibrating a general equilibrium model of business cycles using quarterly data
from the postwar US economy (1948-1997). DeJong and Ingram (2001) report δ =0 .08 in
their business cycle model calibration using quarterly US data between 1948 and 1995, while
Nadiri and Prucha (1996) calculate the annual depreciation rate to be equal to 0.059 using
US manufacturing data for the years 1960-1988. For the period 1960-1994 Lucke (1997)
estimates an annual depreciation rate of around 0.03 for West-Germany.
4 FDI with endogenous expropriation policy
This section sets up a model where expropriation policy is endogenously determined whereas
migration is exogenous. Expropriation of the capital stock can only take place after capital
has been installed. To solve the model by backward induction we therefore solve ﬁrstly for
politically determined FDI ﬂows and secondly for optimal FDI from an individual investor’s
point of view. Thirdly, we analyze under which conditions FDI ﬂows are restricted by the
possibility of expropriation. Finally, we investigate the impact of demographic changes, i.e.
an increase of the share of old individuals in both countries, on FDI.
Non-Expropriation Constraint
When deciding whether to expropriate the foreign capital stock, the developing country’s
government weighs the costs and beneﬁts that arise from expropriation to maximize political
support of the electorate. Political support is given by the weighted sum of the young and
old generations’ utilities, where each generation is weighted by its share in the electorate.
We denote political support in case of non-expropriation by W and political support in case
of expropriation by WE. By setting W ≥ WE we can derive a non-expropriation constraint
as in Harms and an de Meulen (2011), i.e. a condition which makes the government abstain
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The government decides not to expropriate if both generations’ utility gains in terms of
transfers do not exceed the costs in terms of wage losses (Ny∗ − M)/(1 − M) · (1 − θ) ˜ Aw∗.









y∗ − M) , (1)
which constitutes an upper bound of FDI K∗max, compatible with non-expropriation. For
the incentive-compatible level of FDI to be non-negative the following Assumption has to
be met:
Assumption 1 (1 − θ − α) > 0
Note that if θ is low the technology gap ˜ A − A∗ is large. Intuitively, for K∗ not to be
restricted to zero, expropriation has to be costly for the developing country. The incentive-
compatible volume of FDI K∗max increases with the host-country’s net cost of expropriation.
This can be seen from equation (1). The political barrier to FDI ﬂows is relaxed by a
lower θ, by a larger δ and by less emigration. Firstly, with a lower θ the technology gap
˜ A − A∗ increases and so does the wage loss in case of expropriation. Secondly, with a
larger depreciation rate δ, less capital can be distributed after production. Thirdly, less
emigration has three diﬀerent eﬀects. It implies a larger labor force. As a consequence
w∗ drops and so does the wage loss (1 − θ) ˜ Aw∗ incurred by each individual. Moreover,
the return on expropriated capital to be distributed increases. However, the number of
workers suﬀering wage losses becomes larger, increasing the host country’s overall wage cost
(Ny∗ − M)/(1 − M) · (1 − θ) ˜ Aw∗ from expropriation. We call this last eﬀect a political
weight eﬀect. If this last eﬀect outweighs the eﬀect on the capital return, the restriction on
FDI inﬂows is relaxed. This holds since (1 − θ) >αby Assumption 1. Consequently, less
emigration also relaxes the non-expropriation constraint.
In summary, expropriation has to be costly for the host country for non-expropriation
compatible FDI to be larger than zero. Moreover, assuming (1 − θ − α) > 0 the individual
wage loss is large enough for the political weight eﬀect of a larger labor force Ny∗ − M to
relax the non-expropriation constraint. Then, lower labor outﬂows M from the developing
country lower the host country’s willingness to expropriate and additional FDI inﬂows are
feasible. Migration and FDI are thus substitutes, not because they both contribute to
reducing diﬀerences in factor returns, but rather because a larger share of the electorate is
aﬀected negatively by expropriation when emigration is low.
Investment Constraint
In the absence of expropriation risk, the industrialized country’s investors would export
the share of capital necessary to equalize capital returns in both countries. We call the
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Obviously, the diﬀerence in capital returns and thus the optimal level of capital exports is
lower the higher the immigration level, such that K∗opt is a declining function of M.
It is straightforward to understand that no FDI exceeding the non-expropriation com-
patible level is an optimal choice. This is because in case of expropriation, investors only
receive a positive return on the part of capital invested at home. Consequently, utility lev-
els can be increased by investing a larger fraction of capital at home and reducing FDI. If
the non-expropriation compatible level of FDI is not suﬃcient to equalize returns, it does
not pay to further reduce FDI, foregoing high capital returns in the developing country.
Therefore, actual FDI is given by the minimum of K∗opt and K∗max. The assumption that
investors’ capital is administered by a mutual fund solves the coordination problem between
investors of ensuring that the sum of capital ﬂows to the developing country does not exceed
the level compatible with the non-expropriation constraint.
Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
The level of FDI ﬂows is determined by the non-expropriation constraint if K∗max <K ∗opt.
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which holds for all M<N y∗ if
¯ kNo · (1 − δ)





Given the chosen parameter values, both inequalities hold. Most importantly, the chosen
value for θ is not too low. Intuitively, with a very low θ, expropriation would be too costly
for the developing country because of the productivity loss. The possibility of expropriation
then would not limit FDI ﬂows.
Using the benchmark parameter values shown in Table 1, Figure 1 illustrates the individ-
ually optimal and the politically restricted level of FDI inﬂows, K∗opt and K∗max respectively,
for diﬀerent levels of migration outﬂows.
The solid curve shows the non-expropriation constraint and the dashed curve the invest-
ment constraint for diﬀerent levels of emigration. Both decline in emigration. Moreover,
the Figure shows that for all levels of migration 0 ≤ M ≤ Ny∗ the political barrier to FDI
binds (K∗max <K ∗opt).
The eﬀect of population aging on equilibrium FDI is straightforward to derive. While the



















Figure 1: Investment constraint and non-expropriation constraint as functions of migration
demographic structure of the industrialized country does not aﬀect the developing country’s
expropriation decision, a larger share of old individuals in the developing country increases
their political weight. This has the same eﬀect as an increase in emigration: it raises the
political barrier to capital inﬂows, inducing less FDI in equilibrium. Ceteris paribus, FDI
ﬂows to countries with a larger share of young should thus be larger, also in the presence
of political risk. Graphically, K∗max shifts to the right with a larger Ny∗. Quantitatively,
for given migration, a one-percent increase of the share of old individuals in the developing
country transfers into a 1.07 percent decrease of FDI ﬂows.
5 Labor ﬂows with endogenous migration policy
We now proceed with the determination of equilibrium migration for given capital ﬂows.
The industrialized country government ﬁrst sets its entry restriction before labor ﬂows take
place. We solve for the two equations determining the volume of individually optimal and
politically restricted labor ﬂows. We then show that the politically determined demand for
immigrants binds, unless the population share of the young generation is very low. Finally,
we discuss how population aging alters the equilibrium.
Emigration Constraint
If the developing country’s young took their migration decision in the absence of any mi-
gration restrictions, migration would take place until utility levels (and thus wages) in both
14countries are equal. This yields an emigration constraint:
M
opt =
(A/ ˜ A)1/α(¯ kNo − K∗)Ny∗ − K∗Ny
(A/ ˜ A)1/α(¯ kNo − K∗)+K∗ .
Mopt is declining in the level of FDI, since FDI ﬂows reduce wage diﬀerences between both
countries. However, potential migrants have to obey the limit on immigration set by the
industrialized country’s government, the immigration policy constraint Mmax,w h i c hw e
derive in the next subsection.
Immigration Policy Constraint
The industrialized country’s government chooses the labor entry restriction that maximizes
its political support among both generations. Again, political support equals the sum of
the young and the old generation’s utility, each weighted with the respective group size. We
assume that immigrants are nationalized immediately upon entry, which means that they
augment the political weight of the young generation as the government decides whether to
admit more immigrants. This is a technical assumption which allows a closed-form solution
for immigration policy. In the absence of this assumption the politically determined demand
for immigrants may be zero, see the discussion below.6 Although the political participation
of immigrants is typically lower than that of natives, it increases in length of stay (see, for
instance, Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Furthermore, franchise extensions may be
based on rational motives, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2006)
show. Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004), Sand and Razin (2007) and Ortega (2005, 2010) argue
that immigrants do in fact shape policy. Whereas Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004) and Ortega
(2005, 2010) focus on how immigration inﬂuences redistribution policy, Sand and Razin
(2007) also consider the impact of immigration on future immigration policy. Bertocchi and
Strozzi (2010) show that large migrant stocks make the introduction“ius soli”more likely.
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6The young generation’s preferred level of immigration would also be higher in the presence of pay-
as-you-go pensions with ﬁxed beneﬁts. The young would then gain from sharing the burden of pension
contributions with the immigrants.
15Figure 2 shows utility in the industrialized country based on the benchmark parameter
values. Figure 2(a) shows the utility levels of a representative young as well as a repre-
sentative old agent, Uy and Uo respectively, as deﬁned in section 3 for diﬀerent levels of
migration.7 As illustrated by the dashed line, old investors beneﬁt from larger immigration
but at a declining rate. If migration approaches its maximum old agents’ attitudes toward
immigration even turn around. This is because migration raises the capital return on the
part of capital invested in the industrialized country but decreases the capital return on the
part invested in the developing country. If migration is low, the marginal return gain in the
industrialized country through an additional labor inﬂow compensates the marginal capital
return loss on the part invested in the developing economy. Hence, Uo increases with migra-
tion if M is small. In turn, each young worker clearly suﬀers from additional competition
on the labor market and prefers zero migration. As the solid curve shows, Uy decreases
with M for all possible migration levels. Since the young generation’s initial utility loss,
i.e. at M = 0, exceeds the old generation’s utility gain, migration would be restricted to
zero if migrants are not asserted political rights upon entry. Admitting immigrants who are
nationalized upon entry does, however, initially increase the sum of utilities which determine
the government’s objective function.





















(a) A young and an old agent’s utility






















(b) The young and old generation’s
weighted sum of utilities
Figure 2: Utility in the industrialized country as a function of migration
Figure 2(b) illustrates the sum of both generations’ welfare (the term which the local
government seeks to maximize) and each generation’s welfare share, W o = No/(1+M)·Uo
and W y =( Ny + M)/(1 + M) · Uy, separately. The eﬀect of migration on W y and W o is
contingent on the capital share α. In our benchmark parameterization, α is low and the
wage loss from a marginal increase of migration cannot compensate for the increase of the
young generation’s population share. W y then increases with M as illustrated by the dotted
curve in Figure 2(b). Likewise, for the chosen level of α, the marginal eﬀect of migration
7for K∗ =0 .005
16on capital returns is weak and is also dominated by the eﬀect on the relative sizes of both
generations. Hence, W o decreases with M. This can be seen from the dashed curve in
Figure 2(b). For any given level of K∗, Mmax|K∗ is given by the maximum of (W y+W o)|K∗.
Mmax cannot be written as a function of K∗ but results from all possible levels of K∗ and
the corresponding Mmax|K∗, see Figure 3.8
Mmax|K∗ is implicitly given by the ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem (5),
which reads as follows:
¯ k · N














Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
International labor ﬂows are politically restricted if Mmax <M opt. Note that the immigra-
tion policy constraint binds if w>w ∗ holds for M = Mmax. From equation (3) a suﬃcient
condition for this to be true is Ny + αNy∗ ≥ (1 − α)2, which is fulﬁlled for our benchmark
parameters (see Figure 3). This is because Mmax is lower the larger the respective shares of
young workers in both countries. We will elaborate on this later in this section.

















Figure 3: Emigration constraint and immigration policy constraint as functions of FDI
From Figure 3, illustrating the individually optimal and politically restricted migration
levels for diﬀerent levels of FDI, it can be seen that Mmax is decreasing in FDI.9 Analytically,
8Note that, among the parameters in our model, the depreciation rate δ crucially determines the chosen
level of immigration. Ceteris paribus, for lower levels of δ, the gross capital return of the old generation
is higher, increasing the sum of old agents’ utilities. Then, in order to maximize the weighted sum of
the total population’s utility, the industrialized country’s government will shift political weight from the
young toward the old generation by permitting less immigration. If δ approaches zero, the migration barrier
becomes stricter and migration is even restricted to zero if δ is too low.
9Note that we have switched x and y axes in Figure 3 to have the same axis order throughout the paper.
17this can be shown using the implicit function theorem where a suﬃcient condition for the
downward slope is 1 − α ≥ Ny + αNy∗. Hence, Mmax is a negative function of K∗ and
restricts migration inﬂows to the industrialized country if Assumption 2 holds true.
Assumption 2 1 − α ≥ Ny + αNy∗ ≥ (1 − α)2 .
Note that 1 − α ≥ Ny + αNy∗ and thus ∂Mmax/∂K∗ < 0h o l d si fα is not too large.
The intuition behind the downward slope of Mmax with respect to K∗ is the following.
Firstly, with larger capital exports, the old generation’s support for immigration decreases.
Naturally, seeking high capital returns, investors aim to combine their capital with labor.
Thus, with a larger fraction of capital invested abroad, investors favor less labor migration
from the foreign into the home economy. This eﬀect becomes stronger with a lower level of
α, since a lower α coincides with a larger labor share, increasing the marginal capital return
loss of emigration in the developing country. Secondly, with additional capital exports, the
wage of each young worker declines and so does the wage bill and the welfare of the young
generation. Then, from the government’s perspective, maximizing the welfare of the young
generation – by admitting more immigrants – matters less. Thirdly, with a lower wage level,
the positive marginal eﬀect of M on the welfare of the young generation decreases, since
each additional migrant adds less wage income to the overall wage bill. The latter two eﬀects
are also strengthened by a lower α which additionally lowers the wage level and hence the
welfare and political weight of the young generation.
We next analyze how the immigration policy constraint reacts to increases in the pop-
ulation share of old individuals in both countries. As the developing country’s labor force
declines, this does not aﬀect young workers’ preferred level of immigration. The return on
foreign investment of the industrialized country’s old investors drops. This has two coun-
teracting eﬀects on old investors’ political support for immigration. On the one hand, the
lower return in the developing country ceteris paribus lowers income and thus welfare and
political support of the old generation. Then, marginally increasing the limit on immigra-
tion, which decreases the share of old individuals, is less costly in terms of the marginal loss
of political support from the old generation. On the other hand, a reduced labor force in the
developing country raises the negative marginal eﬀect of emigration on the capital return
there. Hence, old investors suﬀer a larger marginal utility loss from additional migration.
It can be shown analytically that Mmax increases with No∗ in situations where migration is
initially low, that is if
M
max <
(1 − α) · (Ny∗ − α)
1 − α2 .
Intuitively, with little migration ﬂows, there is a large number of workers in the developing
country, reducing the negative marginal eﬀect of emigration on the capital return there. As
a result, old investors suﬀer only a low marginal utility loss from migration and support
larger migration ﬂows. Hence, with a lower population share of the young in the developing
18country, the solid Mmax curve in Figure 3 shifts to the right unless migration is already very
large.
The quantitative eﬀect of a marginal increase of the population share of old agents in the
developing country on migration depends on the level of FDI. To measure the quantitative
eﬀect, we set K∗ to the point where the policy functions Mmax and K∗max intersect, see
Figure 5. This is sensible since the intersection point determines the equilibrium levels
of migration and FDI in an environment of both endogenous expropriation and migration
policies. From that point a one-percent increase of No∗ increases migration by 0.5 %.
A larger population share of old agents in the industrialized country also has counter-
acting eﬀects on demand for immigration. It implies a larger capital stock ¯ kNo since with
an exogenous capital endowment per investor ¯ k and for given FDI K∗, the share of capi-
tal invested at home must increase. Firstly, this increases the weight of domestic capital
returns in old investors’ utility functions. Secondly, with a larger population share of old
agents in the industrialized country, the domestic labor force declines. Then, the marginal
return gain of additional immigration in the investors’ home economy becomes larger. Both
eﬀects enhance each old investor’s support for migration. However, the sum of old agents’
utilities increases, simply because the number of old agents increases. As the welfare of the
old generation is larger, the industrialized country’s government will ceteris paribus admit
less migration to shift political weight from the young toward the old generation.
Turning to the young generation, each young worker beneﬁts from the higher capital
intensity in the industrialized country, implying higher wages. The government will ceteris
paribus admit additional migrants to shift political weight to the group of young workers
each earning high wages.
Overall one can show that the eﬀect of a larger fraction of old agents in the industrialized
country on migration is positive – thereby shifting the solid curve in Figure 3 to the right –
unless the fraction of capital invested abroad is too high. Naturally, with a larger amount of
FDI, the beneﬁt from immigration on domestic capital returns of old investors is lower, and
since domestic wage levels decline, the positive eﬀect of migration on the young generation’s
weighted sum of utilities vanishes. However, for Mmax not to increase with No, K∗ would
have to exceed the maximum plausible level of FDI K∗opt(M = 0), which can be ruled out.
The quantitative eﬀect of a marginal increase of the population share of old agents in the
industrialized country is large. Starting from the intersection of Mmax and K∗max from
Figure 5, a one-percent increase in No induces an increase in migration of 23 %.
196 FDI and migration with endogenous policy restric-
tions
We now turn to an environment where both expropriation and migration policy are deter-






Figure 4: Sequence of Events
As argued in section 4, expropriation of the capital stock can only take place after capital
has been installed. Moreover, as argued in section 5, the industrialized country decides on
maximum migration before labor ﬂows take place. We assume simultaneity with respect to
the investors capital allocation decision and the migration policy decision.10 Hence, neither
the developing country government nor the industrialized country investors may inﬂuence
the level of migration. Similarly, neither the industrialized country government nor the
potential (developing country) migrants may inﬂuence FDI. Therefore, given equation (2)
and Assumption 2, the political mobility barriers bind. The equilibrium levels of FDI and
migration are thus politically determined. We now show that there is a unique intersection
point between the non-expropriation constraint K∗max and the immigration policy constraint
Mmax, determining the equilibrium. We then analyze the eﬀects of marginal changes in the
two countries’ age structures on the equilibrium.
Equilibrium
We ﬁrst prove that there must be at least one intersection point between K∗max and Mmax.
We then show that there is a unique intersection point, determining a unique equilibrium
for factor ﬂows between the two countries.
Lemma 1 There does exist at least one intersection point between the policy constraint
functions K∗max and Mmax, determining equilibrium FDI and migration in a situation of
endogenous policy.
Proof 1 Using the fact that Mmax declines with larger FDI ﬂows and K∗max declines with
larger migration, there must be at least one intersection point between the two policy barri-
ers, since
10If, in contrast, the migration policy decision is taken before the investors allocate their capital to
both countries, the industrialized country government may loosen the expropriation constraint by conﬁning
immigration.
20i) At K∗ =0 : K∗max lies above Mmax.
ii) At M =0 : K∗max lies underneath Mmax.
Ad i): K∗max =0if M = Ny∗. However, argmaxM W o(K∗ =0 )+W y(K∗ =0 )<N y∗,
if α is small: The ﬁrst order condition of the industrialized country governments’s objective
function at K∗ =0is
A(¯ kN
o)







o(1 − δ) .
The left-hand-side increases with M while the right-hand-side decreases with M. Moreover,
since the left-hand-side decreases with α, less migration is necessary to solve the upper ﬁrst
order condition if α is low. Given our benchmark parameter values, α is indeed suﬃciently
low for M<N y∗ to solve the ﬁrst order condition even at K∗ =0 . Recall the intuition
stated in section 5: with a lower α, the political support maximizing level of migration is
lower.






Ny∗. However, the industri-
alized country’s government does not choose zero migration for K∗ ≤ K∗max(M =0 )since,
analytically, the derivative of the political support function is not equal to zero but negative
at K∗ = K∗max(M =0 ) . Intuitively, the government can always enhance the welfare of
the young generation simply by increasing the number of that group with the help of addi-
tional immigration. This overstates the old generation’s marginal welfare loss of admitting
the ﬁrst immigrant at K∗ = K∗max(M =0 ) . Put diﬀerently, FDI has to be larger than
K∗ = K∗max(M =0 )for an initial labor outﬂow from the developing country to cause gross
capital return losses there, which are so large, that the industrialized country’s government
is not willing to admit a single worker from abroad.
In summary, there is at least one equilibrium where Mmax intersects K∗max from top to
bottom.
Lemma 2 There is only one intersection point between the policy constraints K∗max and
Mmax, determining unique equilibrium levels of FDI and migration in a situation of endoge-
nous policy.
Proof 2 Note that an equilibrium is given by an intersection point of Mmax and K∗max.
In equilibrium, migration thus has to solve the ﬁrst order condition of the industrialized
country government’s maximization problem, where K∗ equals K∗max, i.e. at this point,
the derivative of the political support function with respect to M has to be equal to zero.
However, at K∗ = K∗max this derivative monotonously increases with M. As a result, there
is a unique level of migration solving the ﬁrst order condition.
21The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5. It is given by the intersection point between
the dashed Mmax curve and the K∗max line.
















Figure 5: FDI and migration in equilibrium
Comparative Statics
Sections 4 and 5 have shown how policies limiting international factor mobility are aﬀected
by world population aging. Migration increases as the population in either country ages.
FDI is not aﬀected by population aging in the industrialized country and decreases as the
population in the developing country ages. The impact of aging is even stronger when the
interplay between migration and expropriation policies is taken into account. Following the
sequence of events illustrated in Figure 4 the industrialized country’s government sets its mi-
gration policy at the same time as investors choose the fraction of ¯ kNo to be invested abroad.
Hence, when deciding on migration and foreign investment, agents take the respective other
decision as given.
We begin with the eﬀects of a larger fraction of old agents in the developing country
(Figure 6(a)).11 The migration barrier is relaxed since the return on FDI drops if the
size of the working age group in the host economy declines. Then, old investors from the
industrialized country suﬀer from lower income and utility. Following its aim to maximize
the weighted sum of utilities, the government will admit additional immigrants to shift
political weight away from the old generation. The investment constraint becomes stricter,
since a lower population share of the young generation transfers into a lower political weight
of the group that opposes expropriation.
11To illustrate the comparative statics eﬀects graphically, the increase of No and No∗ have been chosen
suﬃciently large. However, the extent of these increases does not aﬀect our qualitative results.
22While the level of non-expropriation compatible investment ﬂows drops with No∗,t h e
volume of this eﬀect is underestimated if the repercussions from the relaxation of the migra-
tion restriction are not taken into account. With larger labor outﬂows, the share and thus
political weight of the young age cohort opposing expropriation declines, further restrict-
ing FDI. Additionally, with less FDI ﬂows, the migration barrier is further relaxed, again
reducing foreign investment compatible with non-expropriation. Starting from the bench-
mark equilibrium, a one-percent increase of No∗ leads to a decline of FDI ﬂows by 1.4 % in
contrast to just 1.07 % if the repercussions from the immigration policy are not taken into
account. Analogously, the relaxation of the migration restriction is larger with FDI endoge-
nously determined by the expropriation policy. The quantitative eﬀect equals an increase of
migration by 4.3 % instead of 0.5 %. We now discuss the eﬀect of a decreasing labor force
in the industrialized country (Figure 6(b)). The domestic government reacts by relaxing
the migration barrier, taking FDI ﬂows as given. While migration ﬂows increase, the non-
expropriation compatible level of FDI ﬂows does not change with the age composition in the
industrialized country. The relaxation of the migration restriction aﬀects the relative size of
the young generation in the developing country. With a lower fraction of young workers op-
posing expropriation, the political barrier to FDI becomes tighter. Moreover, with less FDI,
the industrialized country can enhance its’ political support through additional migration.
As a result of the joint analysis of political restrictions to migration and FDI, the increase
of immigration in the wake of aging in the domestic society is considerably larger compared
to an analysis where FDI is taken to be exogenous. Migration increases by 29 %, compared
to just 23 % if the response of the expropriation policy is taken as exogenous. Moreover
FDI ﬂows are no longer unaﬀected, but decrease by 2.2 % as a reaction to a one-percent
change in the age structure in the foreign industrialized economy.

























(a) Eﬀects of a larger No∗
























(b) Eﬀects of a larger No
Figure 6: Comparative statics eﬀects of population aging
237C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed migration and investment barriers in a comprehensive model.
We have investigated the impact of population aging on those barriers in a one-period setting
with sequential decisions in an industrialized and a developing country. The government in
the industrialized country decides how many immigrants to admit whereas the government
in the developing country decides whether to expropriate FDI or not. Although we also
derived supply of migrant labor and of FDI, we showed that the demand for migrant labor
and FDI, determined by the policy decisions in the two countries, binds.
We found that, as in models without policy restrictions, migration and FDI are substi-
tutes, but that the drivers of this result are fundamentally diﬀerent. Emigration of young
workers from the developing country enhances the older generation’s political weight. Since
this generation clearly beneﬁts from expropriation, the volume of non-expropriation com-
patible FDI decreases. The allocation of capital to the developing country reduces demand
for immigrants for two reasons. Firstly, the investors’ loss in gross returns on FDI induced
by migration increases. Secondly, domestic wages decrease, making it less worthwhile for
the governments to admit immigrants in order to increase the total wage bill of the labor
force.
With respect to the eﬀect of population aging we found that aging in the industrialized
country increases demand for immigrants but leaves the volume of FDI unaﬀected, whereas
aging in the developing country also increases demand for immigrants but decreases the
volume of non-expropriation compatible FDI: With a larger share of old investors in the
industrialized country, the industrialized economy as a whole owns a larger capital stock.
Since the non-expropriation compatible level of FDI is unchanged, the amount of capital
invested at home increases. The old generation’s preferred level of immigration increases
since they aim at maximizing the sum of gross capital returns in the home and the foreign
economy. Additionally, the domestic wage level and thus welfare of the young generation
increases. This makes it more worthwhile for the government to admit additional immi-
grant workers to increase political support of the young generation, since, by assumption,
immigrants are nationalized upon entry. Similarly, since a larger population share of old
individuals in the developing country implies a lower labor supply, returns on FDI decrease
ceteris paribus. A lower welfare level of its old generation induces the industrialized country
government to admit additional immigrant workers to increase political support of the young
generation instead. Meanwhile, population aging in the developing country reduces the non-
expropriation compatible level of FDI because the population share and thus political weight
of the old generation, which beneﬁts from expropriation, increases.
Most importantly, we show that the eﬀects of population aging become stronger when
the interplay of policies is taken into account. If aging relaxes the immigration barrier, ad-
24ditional labor ﬂows from the developing in the industrialized country are feasible. Then, the
population share of old agents in the developing country increases, enhancing the propensity
to expropriate. As a result, investors will reduce FDI. This in turn increases the demand
for immigrants in the industrialized country.
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